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The Free Men of Colour and the 
Revolution in Saint Domingue, 1789-1792* 
by Robert STEIN ** 
The flame of civil discord seems to rage in this climate with a degree of inveter-
acy unknown in other countrie s. Nothing seems to sati sfy a partisan but the 
sacrifice of his opponent's life and property. 1 
The revolutionary period in Haitian history lasted from 1789 until 
1804. It began as a political movement, with white colonists seeking the 
autonomy of Saint Domingue. It also ended as a political movement, with 
non-whites proclaiming the independence of Haiti . The political transforma-
tion, however, was accompanied by a profound social and economic re-
volution. I propose to discuss one aspect of that revolution, the role played 
by the free men of colour (gens/hommes de couleur fibres), from 1789 
until 4 April 1792, the date on which the legal category "free men of colour" 
ceased to exist. During this period , the free men of colour led an attack 
on the old social order and proposed a new one more adequately reflect-
ing both the economic realities of the colony and the principles of the 
French Revolution. After this period, the new order was itself replaced 
by a third one which virtually welded together race, wealth and status, and 
which formed the basis of Haitian society until the twentieth century. 
The free men of colour played a key role in the Haitian Revolution. 
As members of an intermediary group, they had unique ties with the other 
groups in the colony: the rich whites , the poor whites, and the slaves. 
This pivotal position makes an analysis of the free men of colour funda-
mental to an understanding of the Haitian Revolution , although historians 
have all too often interpreted the Revolution first and then assigned the 
free men of colour a role in it. Marxists viewing the early stages of the 
Haitian Revolution as a bourgeois revolution see the free men of colour as 
members of a bourgeoisie. 2 Such an interpretation, however, ignores the 
fact that the free men of colour derived their economic strength from the 
land and not from commerce, and that they never sought to overthrow 
* I would like to thank the Graphic Arts Department of Erindale College for pro-
viding the Map . 
** Department of History, Erindale College , University of Toronto . 
1 A letter from Cap Fran9ais, dated 4 December 1791 and published 4 January 1792, 
in the Philadelphia Aurora and General Ad1·ertiser. 
' For example , C. L. R. JAM ES, Les Jacobins noirs (Paris: Gallimard, 1949); and 
Edner BRUTUS, R el'Oiution dans Saint Domingue, 2 vols (Belgique: Pantheon, n.d.). 
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LEGEND TO MAP: PARISHES OF SAINT DOMINGUE. 
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Quartier A: Fort Dauphin 
I Fort Dauphin 
2 Ouanaminthe 
3 Valliere 
4 Terrier Rouge 
5 Trou 
Quartier B : Limonade 
6 Limonade 
7 Grande Riviere 
(Sainte Rose) 
8 St. Louis du Morin 
9 Dondon 
10 Marmelade 
Quartier C : Cap 
II Petite Anse 
12 Cap Franc;:ais 
13 Plaine du Nord 
14 Acul 
Quartier D: Limbe 
15 Limbe 
16 Plaisance 
17 Port Margot 
18 Borgne 
Quartier E: Port-de-Paix 
19 Gros Morne 
20 Petit St. Louis 
21 Port-de-Paix 
West Province 
Quartier F: Mole 




Quartier G: St. Marc 
26 Gonaives 
27 Petite Riviere 
28 V errettes 
29 Saint Marc 
Quartier H: Mirebalais 
30 Mirebalais 




Quartier J: Leogane 
34 Leogane 
35 Grand Goave 
Quartier K: Jacmel 




Quartier L: Petit Goave 
39 Petit Goave 
40 Fond-des-Negres 
41 L'Anse-a-Veau 
42 Petit Trou 
Quartier M: St. Louis 
43 Acquin 
44 St. Louis 
45 Cavaillon 
Quartier N : Cayes 
46 Cayes 
47 Torbec 
48 Port Salut 
Quartier 0: Cap Tiburon 
49 Coteaux 
50 Cap Tiburon 
Quartier P: Jeremie 
51 Cap Dalmarie 
52 Jeremie 
the traditional class structure of the colony. Nationalists who believe 
that the Revolution's goal was the establishment of an independent, non-
white Haiti, view the free men of colour as leaders of a national move-
ment. 3 This is to confuse the civil warfare of the early period of the Revolu-
tion with the war of independence of the later period; it also overlooks 
the opposition usually displayed by the free men of colour to the abolition 
of slavery. Historians who interpret the Haitian Revolution as part of the 
French Revolution ask whether the free men of colour were pro- or counter-
revolutionary; 4 but such an imposition of French categories on the Saint 
Domingue situation does not work since local and not national issues 
determined political activity in the colony. Finally, those who see only 
race warfare in the Haitian Revolution call the free men of colour mulat-
toes who fought against both whites and blacks. 5 This is to misunderstand 
the basic nature of the group ''free men of colour'' : it was composed of 
blacks and mulattoes. 
3 For example , Beaubrun ARDOUIN, Etudes sur /'histoire d'Hai"ti , II vols (Port-au-
Prince: Franc;:ois Dalencourt , 1958, originally published in 1853-60). 
4 Such interpretations are discussed in Gerard M. LAURENT, Contribution a /'his-
toire de Saint Domingue (Port-au-Prince: La Phalange, 1971), p. 33. 
5 For example , T. Lothrop SToDDARD, The French Revolution in San Domingo 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1914) ; and, to a lesser degree, Thomas 0. OTT, The Haitian 
Re volution, 1789-1814 (Knoxville, Tenn. : University of Tennessee , 1973). 
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Clearly, the Haitian Revolution was far too complex to have any 
simple interpretation, and the role of the free men of colour cannot be 
reduced to a narrow formula. Economic, national, ideological and racial 
conflicts were present throughout the revolutionary period, and they 
varied in relative significance as the Revolution progressed. Similarly, 
the free men of colour acted inconsistently. According to the time and to 
the region of Saint Domingue, they acted primarily according to interests 
of class, nationality , political philosophy, or race. From 1789 to 1792, 
questions of race and class dominated. The Haitian Revolution upset the 
equilibrium of colonial society, and especially the harmony which had 
prevailed between wealth , race and status; and in the early days of the 
Revolution there was a struggle between two conceptions of colonial so-
ciety. The whites wanted race to remain the crucial factor in determining 
social and political status, while the free men of colour insisted that wealth 
should be the decisive criterion. The free men of colour won the battle on 
4 April 1792, when racial considerations were officially eliminated from 
coloniallawbooks. 
Saint Domingue was one of the largest of the European colonies in 
the West Indies, measuring about 12,000 square miles. 6 However, only 
about one-fifth of the colony was inhabitable, as rugged mountain chains 
unsuitable for large-scale cultivation covered most of the surface area. 
Here runaway slaves, army deserters and impoverished free men of all 
colours eked out a miserable existence. The mountains divided Saint Do-
mingue into three natural provinces which the French made into administrat-
ive districts: the North, the West and the South as shown on the Map. 
Communications between the three provinces were difficult, particularly 
between the North and the rest of the colony. Even the opening of a new 
road from Cap Fran<yais to Port-au-Prince in 1787 scarcely improved mat-
ters, 7 a fact which the whites came to appreciate late in 1791 when they 
attempted with considerable success to prevent the slave rebellion in the 
North from spreading. In each province, population and the labour-intens-
ive sugar industry were concentrated on plains, while the coffee industry, 
based on smaller plantations using fewer workers, was a feature of the 
hill-country. 
The natural isolation of each of the three provinces encouraged the 
development of local political and social differences and fostered inter-
provincial rivalries which could be intense. 8 The North was the most 
prosperous province and it enjoyed natural and historic advantages. Bless-
ed with naturally irrigated, fertile soil, and situated along a major Carib-
bean shipping lane, the North was invariably the first and frequently the 
6 This section is based on Mederic-Louis-Elie MoREAU DE SAINT-MERY, Des-
cription .. . de Ia partie franc;aise de /'isle de Saint Domingue, 3 vols (Paris: Societe de 
l' histoire des colonies franc;:aises , 1958, originally published in 1797), I: 27ff. 
7 lbid .,l : ll8. 
8 ARDOUIN, Etudes, I: 22-25. Ardouin interpreted Haitian history in terms of 
regional conflict. 
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only stop for ships coming from Europe. 9 The North was also the first part 
of the colony to be settled by Frenchmen, in this case piraticalfiibustiers 
and boucaniers who crossed to the Saint Domingue mainland from their 
den on Tortuga Island. Their successors in the North developed the most 
sophisticated farming methods on the island, and although it was the small-
est of the three provinces, the North by the end of the old regime was 
producing more than three-quarters of Saint Domingue's clayed sugar and 
nearly half of its coffee (Table 1). 10 In 1789, the North was the domain 
of great planters, merchants, and modest property-owners, and had relati-
vely few poor whites or free men of colour (Table 2). 11 Both poor whites 
and free men of colour lived either in Cap Fran<;:ais, the largest city on the 
island, or in the coffee-producing hill-country beyond the sugar-producing 
Northern Plain. In spite of large numbers of p<1or whites in Cap Fran<;:ais, 
the town was still firmly controlled by planters and by the rich merchants 
who handled the colony's trade with France. 
Table 1. - SAINT DOMINGUE PRODUCTION ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 






















The West was the largest province and was in an intermediate his-
toric, geographic and economic position. Settled after the North, the West 
lacked some of the North's natural advantages, and particularly natural 
irrigation. It was nonetheless a prosperous area in 1789, producing nearly 
three-quarters of the colony's muscovado (an inferior form of raw sugar) 
and nearly two-fifths of its coffee (Table 1). 12 On the eve of the Revolu-
tion, the West had the most balanced mixture of free population in the 
colony, with almost equal numbers of whites and free non-whites (Table 2). 
The whites were evenly divided into rich, modest, and poor: the rich 
owned large sugar plantations on the plains ; the modest had small sugar 
or coffee plantations on fairly good land; and the poor gravitated towards 
the towns, especially Saint Marc and Port-au-Prince, the capital of the 
colony. For their part, the free men of colour split into three main groups: 
9 MoREAU, Description , 1:118-19. 
10 Archives de Ia Chambre de Commerce de Marseille (hereafter ACCMx), H 19, 
Tableau des finances et du commerce de Ia partie fran<,:aise de Saint Domingue. Clayed sugar: 
53 million pounds out of 70 million; coffee: 33 million pounds out of 68 million. 
11 All population figures are from MoREAU, on a parish-by-parish basis. 
12 ACCMx, H 19, Tableau des finances. Clayed sugar: 69 million pounds out of 
93 million: coffee: 27 million pounds out of 68 million. 
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an urban one at Saint Marc, a rather poor coffee-producing one in Mire-
balais Parish, and a fairly rich sugar and coffee-producing one in Leogane 
Parish. There were also a fair number of free men of colour in Port-au-
Prince Parish, divided evenly between the town itself and the surrounding 
hills. Finally, there was the South Province, the last area to be settled. 
Although nearly as large as the West, the South produced only muscovado 
in any significant quantities (Table 1). 13 Its distant location made it unat-
tractive to French shippers, and residents of the South were rapidly earning 
a reputation for smuggling with nearby Jamaica. The South was settled 
primarily by petits blancs and free men of colour, and there were large 
concentrations of both in the western end of the peninsula (Table 2). 
Table 2.- SAINT DOMING UE POPULATION ON THE EVE OF TH E REVOLUTION . 
Province Whites Free M en of Colour Sla ves 
a. Total Given by Moreau de Saint-Mery 
North 16 ,000 9 ,000 170-180,000 
West 14,000 12,000 168,000 
South 10 ,000 6,500 114,000 
Total 40 ,000 27,500 452-462,000 
B. Total Using Moreau ' s Parish-by-Parish Data 
North 11 , 176 6,637 140, 166 
West 13,764 10,952 180,452 
South 8,713 5,835 104,528 
Total 33,653 23 ,424 425 ,146 
Source: M.-L.-E. MOREA U DE SAINT-MERY, Description ... de Ia partie fran r aise de /'isle 
de Saint Domingue. 
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, there was little social 
conflict on Saint Domingue. For all practical purposes, the population 
was divided into two fairly homogeneous castes, with race, social status, 
economic position and political power in harmony. The inferior caste was 
composed of slaves; whether of mixed or pure blood, of African or creole 
origin, they were condemned by their colour to furnishing virtually all 
the manual labour in the colony. 14 There were more than 400 ,000 slaves 
by 1789. The superior caste was white. Before the middle of the century, 
almost all whites were property owners and many belonged to the grand 
blanc class of wealthy sugar planters. 15 Having few internal divisions , the 
13 Ibid. Muscovado : 20 million pounds out of 93 million ; clayed sugar : 4 mil-
lion pounds out of 70 million ; coffee: 7 million pounds out of 68 million. 
14 For slaves in Saint Domingue, see especially Gabriel DEBI EN, L es esc/aves aux 
Antilles fran raises (XVII" -XVIII" siecles) (Basse-Terre , Guadeloupe: Societe de l'histoire de 
Ia Guadeloupe, 1974), which has an extensive bibliography. 
15 On the grands blancs, see MoREAU, Description , I: 34-38 ; Gabriel DEBIEN , Les 
colons de Saint Domingue et Ia R evolution (Paris ; A. Colin , 1953) , pp . 40-44. 
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whites controlled the local economy and a rather aristocratic society 
without much dissent. The only problem was posed by the "French" 
group of whites, merchants and administrators whose first allegiance was 
to France. Conflict, however, was minimal in the first half of the century, 
primarily because warfare had not yet upset the fragile health of the colo-
ny's economy and because the numbers of petits blancs and free men of 
colour were still small. 
After the War of the Austrian Succession and more particularly after 
the Seven Years' War, significant changes in the composition of the free 
population put an end to the grands blancs' tranquillity. One problem 
faced by free colonial society was the rise of a large petit blanc class, 16 
which was particularly numerous on Saint Domingue, forming in 1789 
nearly half the white population instead of a third as in the Lesser Antil-
les. 17 Coming to the island after 1763, they generally had little money and, 
although some were successful in establishing small coffee plantations in 
the more remote areas of the colony, most lived as artisans, shopkeepers, 
or day-labourers in the larger towns or as overseers on the larger planta-
tions. 18 The arrival of a significant number of "small whites" on Saint 
Domingue sharply increased class conflict: the petits blancs soon develop-
ed an intense dislike for their white superiors. They also developed an 
even more intense hatred for their non-white inferiors ; and it was the 
intractability of the petit blanc class which helped shape the early days of 
the Haitian Revolution. 
An even greater problem was posed in the second half of the eight-
eenth century by the great increase in the numbers of the free men of 
colour. This was a racially mixed group whose composition was defined by 
law. Composed of slaves set free by their masters, children of free white 
mothers and non-white fathers (whether slave or free), and all children 
born to free non-white mothers, the free men of colour included all persons 
who were free but who had some African blood. 19 Even the slightest 
amount of black blood made for a man of colour; according to Moreau de 
Saint-Mery, some people never admitted "the possibility of the total dis-
appearance of the trade of mixture'', and claimed that even one part in 
8,192 constituted colour. 20 By the eve of the Revolution, the free men of 
colour were exceptionally numerous on Saint Domingue, and their number 
had grown rapidly. In 1771, there were only 6,000 of them as opposed to 
18,000 whites, but by 1789 they numbered 28,000 while the whites were but 
16 A rather sympathetic picture of petits blancs is found in MoREAU, Description, 
2: 1105. 
17 Charles FROSTIN, Les revoltes blanches ii Saint Domingue XVIIe et XVIIJe sii'•cles 
(Paris: L'Ecole, 1975), p. 68. 
18 DEB IEN, Colons, p. 40; FROSTIN, Revo/tes, pp. 68-69; Adolphe CABON, Histoire 
d' Haiti, 4 vols (Port-au-Prince: Edition de Ia Petite revue, n.d.), I: 137. 
19 Code Nair , articles 13 and 55, reprinted in Lucien PEYTRAUD, L' esclavage aux 
Antilles franr;aises avant 1789 (Paris, 1897), pp. 158-66. 
20 MOREAU, Description, I: 99. 
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30,000 21 This increase was due both to a high rate of reproduction and to 
the more liberal use by the whites of their powers of enfranchisement. 22 
The sharp increase in the numbers of both the free men of colour 
and the petits blancs led to social tensions on Saint Domingue. The funda-
mental problem was the almost obsessive hatred which the petits blancs 
developed for the free men of colour. Although some of the hatred was 
simply racial, much was economic: petits blancs and free men of colour 
competed for jobs in the towns, and whites resented losing out to free men 
of colour. Even more galling was the fact that some free men of colour had 
succeeded in amassing fortunes far greater than the modest holdings of the 
petits blancs. According to Julien Raimond, " deputy for the citizens of 
colour at the National Assembly", his people owned more than half the 
land and a third of the slaves on Saint Domingue. 23 Although this was 
probably an exaggeration, the free men of colour did make many land 
purchases late in the old regime, particularly in the less immediately at-
tractive areas of the recently settled West and South. 24 There was thus a 
significant number of free men of colour who owned plantations and slaves, 
albeit for the most part coffee plantations with modest numbers of slaves . 
These free men of colour tried to imitate the life style of the white planters, 
sending their children to France to be educated and believing "strongly 
in their French culture". 25 They also performed important services to the 
colony, such as hunting runaway slaves. 
With the economic problems came racial problems, as the petits 
blancs turned to racism to compensate for their own economic failings. 
They could simply not tolerate the success of what they considered an 
inferior race, and they developed elaborate racial arguments to prove their 
own superiority. Equality, they said, was fine for the men of France or 
Europe for , in spite of economic differences, they were all from the same 
race. "A Saint Domingue, au contraire, les hommes sont de deux espe-
21 FRosnN, Revoltes, p. 28. In the Lesser Antilles , the 1789 figures were 24,000 
whites and 8,000 free men of colour (ibid. , p. 29) . It should be noted that all figures are 
subject to debate, as most eighteenth-century authors probably inflated the number of 
whites and decreased the number of free men of colour and slaves (the latter for tax purposes). 
MoREAU, Description , I : 119: 2: 722 : 3: 1162 , says that there were 40,000 whites and 27,500 
free men of colour, but his parish-by-parish totals add up to 33,653 and 23,423 , respective-
ly. Finally, Jacques Ho UDAILLE, "Quelques donnees sur Ia population de Saint Domingue 
au XVIII< siecle", Population , 28 (1973): 60, says there were 28 ,000 whites and 30,000 
free men of colour , but he gives no sources. 
22 On reproduction rates , see Jacques Ho UDAILLE, " Trois paroisses de Saint 
Domingue au XVIII< siecle" , Population, 18 (1963): 102-3. On the question of enfranchise-
ment , see DEBIEN , Esc/al'es, pp. 368-91, and the same author' s Etudes antillaises (Paris: 
A. Colin, 1956) , pp. 116-17 . See also Fran~ois GIRON, La vie quotidienne de Ia societe creole 
(Paris: Hachette, 1972) , pp. 194-201 ; and Jacques BARROS, "De quelques documents 
inedits concernant Saint Domingue (1785-1793)" , Conjonction , 118 (1972) : 45-49. 
23 Julien RAIMOND , Veritables origines des troubles de Saint Domingue (Paris , 
1792), p. 3 (Bibliotheque Nationale (hereafter BN) , Lk12 401) . 
24 Yvan DEB BASCH, Couleur et liberte (Paris: Dalloz, 1967), I: 82-9 1, 121 ; GIROD , 
Vie quotidienne , p. 202 ; JAMES, Jacobins noirs , pp. 34-35; CABON, Histoire , 2: 546 , says 
that the free men of colour probably owned one-fifth of the land. 
25 BR UTUS, Re1•olution , I: 226. 
THE FREE MEN OF COLOUR 15 
ces differentes ... et ces deux especes d'hommes ont donne naissance a 
une troisieme espece hybride.'' 26 This third type was free but certainly 
not equal; their black heritage rendered them incapable of assuming the 
responsibilities of full citizenship. Thus, the petits blancs defined the free 
men of colour in racial terms as halfbreeds or mulattoes, rather than in 
legal terms as a group including both mulattoes and blacks. 
To counteract the economic gains made by the free men of colour, 
the petits blancs managed to have racial theory translated into practice 
in the second half of the eighteenth century. 27 With the support of the 
grands blancs - who could never overcome their racial prejudices to 
form a stable alliance with the richer free men of colour- the petits blancs 
humiliated the free men of colour and denied them their rights. In theory, 
the latter were fully equal to all French citizens. The foundation for their 
rights was article 59 of the Code Nair (1685): "Nous [Louis XIV] octroyons 
aux affranchis les memes droits, privileges et immunites dont jouissent 
les personnes nees libres". 28 Thus, with some minor exceptions such 
as exclusion from noble status, 29 the law clearly considered the free men 
of colour to be the equals of other Frenchmen, and this remained true 
until the Seven Years' War. After the war, that is, when the numbers of 
petits blancs and free men of colour began to grow dramatically, the situa-
tion changed, and the free men of colour were subjected to a harsher 
legal regime. They lost the right to enter France without special permis-
sion; they were denied the right of assembly even in small groups for 
apolitical purposes ; and they were required to perform military or police 
duty but without the hope of reaching officer rank. 30 These restrictions 
angered the free men of colour, and in the 1780s they began to make 
efforts to have them lifted. 31 In effect, their goal was the opposite of the 
goal of the petits blancs: where the latter wanted a society ordered ac-
cording to race, the former wanted wealth to determine social status, 
regardless of race. 
Thus, on the eve of the French Revolution, there were important 
social problems in colonial society, but there was still little hint of a social 
revolution. Indeed, the only question which seemed at all likely to produce 
a major confrontation was a narrowly political one: who should govern 
Saint Domingue? And this seemed to foretell not a civil war but a war of 
26 Reprinted, among other places, in Idees sommaires sur quelques reglements ii 
faire par l'Assemblee Coloniale (Cap Fran<;ais, 1790), pp. 5-12 (BN, Lk12 265). 
27 DEBBASCH, Couleur, 1: 95-104. The free men of colour could be subjected to 
arbitrary physical punishment, too. See the report of an unprovoked caning meted out by a 
white to a free man of colour, in BARROS, "Quelques documents", pp. 37-39. 
28 Reprinted in PEYTRAUD, L'esclavage, pp. 158-66. 
29 Auguste LEBEAU, De Ia condition des gens de couleur fibres sous ['Ancien re-
gime (Poitiers, 1903), p. 25. 
30 Ibid., pp. 11, 33-44. See also Abbe GREGOIRE, Memoire en faveur des gens de 
couleur (Paris, 1789), pp. 5ff (BN, Lk9 70). The free men of colour fought- under white 
officers - in Georgia during the American Revolution; see CABON, Histoire, 2: 397ff. See 
also Archives Departementales de Ia Gironde (hereafter ADG), 6B 14, "Declaration du Roi", 
9 August 1777. 
31 DEB BASCH , Cou/eur, 1: 126-27. 
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independence fought against France. Since its settlement, Saint Domingue 
had been the site of political conflict between the colonists and the French 
administration headed by the intendant and the governor. 32 In the second 
half of the eighteenth century, the conflict centred on trading rights for 
foreigners. Since 1717, all direct commerce between Saint Domingue and 
foreign countries was prohibited. This made little difference to the colo-
nists until first the War of the Austrian Succession (1744-48) and then the 
Seven Years' War (1756-63) interrupted communications with France and 
forced the colonists to buy slaves from, and sell sugar and coffee to, the 
British. After 1763, the government tried to re-impose the old system, but 
this met with stiff resistance from the colonists who believed that the 
French merchants' monopoly over trade served only to retard the develop-
ment of the colony. 33 To circumvent the regulations , the planters de-
veloped a vast interlope trade with British North America and the British 
West Indies . Although the government wanted to eliminate this smuggling, 
it had to act discreetly ; relations between colonists and France had be-
come so strained by the 1780s that colonial administrators had to be content 
merely with keeping Saint Domingue French. 34 
It was against this background of rising tensions that the French 
Revolution arrived in Saint Domingue. As in France, the pre-revolutionary 
period on Saint Domingue was characterized by widespread politicization, 
and interest in the meeting of the Estates-General and in the drafting of 
the cahiers de doleances was keen. 35 Also as in France, the political 
stage on Saint Domingue was dominated at first by the most prestigious 
class, in this case the grands blancs. The great planters were upset in 
1789 because they were suffering from the effects of an overly rapid econo-
mic expansion. 36 Plantation revenues had not yet caught up with increased 
capital investment, and the planters were deep in debt to French merchants . 
The Revolution seemed to provide a quick way out for the planters, and 
they seized the opportunity to try to establish some sort of colonial autono-
my . In concrete terms, they wanted an elected colonial government which 
would end the French merchants' monopoly over colonial trade and imple-
ment a policy of free trade with all nations . 
The planters succeeded in destroying the authority of the French 
government in the colony but failed to create anything viable in its place. 
Like the nobles in France who subverted the royal power, the great plant-
ers opened a Pandora's box when they resorted to extra-legal means. 
32 See Charles FROSTIN , "Histoire de l'autonomisme colon de Ia partie franl(aise 
de Saint Domingue aux xvne et XVIIJe siecles" (these de doctorat d 'Etat, Universite de 
Lille III , 1973). 
33 The government did allow the colonists a limited and tightly-controlled free 
trade, but this concession did little to satisfy colonial demands . On the problems of con-
trolling colonial trade, see Jean TARRADE , Le commerce colonial de Ia France a Ia fin de 
/'Ancien· Regime , 2 vols (Paris : Presses Universitaires de Franct! , 1972). 
34 DEBIEN, Colons, p. 34. 
35 On the opening phases of the Revolution , see CABON , Histoire, 3: 5-22; OTT, 
Haitian R evolution, pp. 28-31 ; and DEB IEN, Colons, pp. 54-78. 
36 See Robert STEIN, "The French Sugar Business in the Eighteenth Century: A 
Quantitative Study", Business History, XXII (January 1980): 5-17. 
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They blithely assumed that they could effect a political or administrative 
revolution without precipitating a social revolution. 37 Their first goal was 
gaining representation of the colony at the coming meeting of the Estates-
General, a move vigorously opposed by the French administrators on the 
island whose powers would be usurped. After illegal elections, thirty-
one deputies for Saint Domingue were named, sixteen from the island and 
fifteen from Paris. The appearance of the would-be deputies at Versailles 
in June 1789 focused attention on Saint Domingue and began a debate 
over the island's social order. Although Saint Domingue succeeded in 
having six of its deputies seated in the National Assembly on 4 July 1789, 38 
the price was steep: the colony's internal regime became a matter of 
public discussion in France. 39 The arrival of the Saint Domingue delega-
tion in Paris had been taken as a challenge to the principles of many French 
liberals and particularly the members of the Societe des Amis des Noirs. 
The ultimate goal of these men was the abolition of slavery, with more 
immediate goals being the ending of the slave trade and the improvement 
of the position of the free men of colour. Since the last goal seemed to 
be the most practical, it was the one emphasized by the abolitionists and 
their allies during the early years of the French Revolution, so that, from 
1789 to 1791, political life on Saint Domingue was dominated by the ques-
tion of the status of the free men of colour. 
Although largely ignored by whites, the free men of colour on Saint 
Domingue were also caught up in the wave of rising expectations which 
swept over the island in 1789. Like the whites, they submitted cahiers de 
doleances and sought representation in the Estates General/National 
Assembly. The goal expressed in the cahiers was simple: the free men of 
colour desired full equality with their white neighbours. 40 All legal restric-
tions should be removed, and free men of colour should be granted the 
rights to pursue any career, travel to France, and even marry white citi-
zens. Like the whites, the free men of colour had a rather callous dis-
regard for their social inferiors and requested the prohibition of cohabi-
tation between free and slave, but they proved more humane in requesting 
that the offspring of such unions be free. These basic demands became the 
rallying cry for abolitionists in the National Assembly, and the plight of 
the free men of colour became a minor cause celebre for liberals. 
Fully aware of the hostile atmosphere on Saint Domingue, 41 the free 
men of colour placed their faith in the National Assembly. Phrasing their 
37 See the cahiers de doh?ances of Saint Domingue, printed in Blanche MAUREL, 
Cahiers de doleances de Ia colonie de Saint Domingue pour les Etats Generaux de 1789 
(Paris: E. Leroux, 1933) , pp. 263-82. 
38 Archives parlementaires , 8: 190. 
39 Ibid., 8: 187, has remarks by Mirabeau about the structure of colonial society. 
4° Cahier contenant les plaintes, doteances, et reclamations des citoyens fibres et 
proprietaires de couleur des /les et colonies franr;aises (n.p., n.d.), article 3 (BN, Le 24 203). 
41 The condition of the free men of colour had deteriorated markedly on Saint 
Domingue since the beginning of the Revolution. See Michel MINA, Adresse ii /'Assemblee 
Nationale par les hommes de couleur fibres de Saint Domingue (n .p., n.d.), p. 5 (BN, 
Lk12 946) ; see also FROSTIN, Revoltes, p. 281. 
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argument in revolutionary rhetoric, they told the Assembly that they were 
appealing "au nom des droits sacres de l'Humanite" against ministerial 
despotism, the remains of the feudal system, and inequalities among 
French citizens. 42 They realized that their position caused a moral dilemma 
for the Assembly, particularly after the Declaration of Rights on 26 August 
1789, and they were confident that the Revolution would ultimately benefit 
them. As their chief spokesman, Julien Raimond, put it : " La question 
est ... si Ia politique s'accorde ou ne s'accorde pas avec les principes, la 
justice et l'humanite". 43 
Although the free men of colour presented themselves as the only 
group in the colony truly loyal to France and to the principles of the Re-
volution, the National Assembly sided with the whites early in 1790. 
Subjected to intense lobbying by planters residing in Paris and organized 
into the Club Massiac, the Assembly refused in January 1790, to hear a 
credentials' committee report favouring the admission of two free men of 
colour as deputies. 44 This first white victory was followed by a more 
significant one on 8 March 1790, when the Assembly endorsed the establish-
ment of colonial self-government for internal affairs. 45 The 8 March Decree, 
especially as interpreted by the Instructions of 28 March, 46 was left vague 
enough in its particulars so that the white colonists could legally eliminate 
the free men of colour from the political life of the colony. Thus , the 
first phase of the Parisian side of the Saint Domingue Revolution ended 
with a complete vitory for the whites. They had self-rule and racial domina-
tion , and they were thrilled when the news of the decree arrived. 47 
If the issues in Paris led to clear-cut parliamentary battles for home 
rule and white superiority, things were more complex on the island itself. 
Here each of the three free groups wanted to take advantage of the fluid 
situation to gain its own ends. The grands blancs wanted colonial auto-
nomy while retaining their position as the social elite of the island . The 
petits blancs wanted to establish a popular, racist state. They went beyond 
the grands blancs and supported the full independence of Saint Domin-
gue ; they also wanted a social revolution among the whites on the island. 
According to one petit blanc, the colony had three enemies: the philan-
thropists who supported the free men of colour and the slaves, the minis-
ters who ruled the colony from Paris, and the aristocrats who dominated 
colonial society. 48 Finally, there were the free men of colour who had 
42 Reclamations adressees a /'Assemblee Nationale par les personnes de couleur 
(n.p., n.d .), p. I (BN, Lk12 232). 
43 RAIMOND , Veritables origines, pp. 1-2. 
44 On the lobbying efforts of both whites and free men of colour, see GREGO IRE , 
Mem oire; RAIMOND, Veritab/es origines, pp. 18-19; DEB I EN, Colons, ch . 7; CABON , 
Histoire , 3: 34; DEBBASCH, Cou/eur, I: 144-66. 
45 Archi1·es parlementaires, 12 : 72. 
46 Ibid., 12: 387. 
47 See the reaction of one merchant , dated 23 April 1790 in Archives Departe-
mentales de Ia Seine-Maritime, Fonds Begouen Demeaux (hereafter ADSM, BDM), L 50. 
48 M. BAILLOT, L' anti-Brissot par 1111 petit blanc de Saint Domingue (Cap Fran-
~ais, n.d.) , p. I (BN, Lk 12 360) . 
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little interest in the narrowly political revolution but who ardently desired 
a social revolution which would grant them equality with the whites. This 
revolution was to be limited by two considerations. First, there was no 
desire to abolish the class structure existing in the white community; 
they wanted merely to be integrated into that structure. Second, the free 
men of colour accepted the continued existence of slavery . Indeed, just 
as they had offered the Assembly the loyalty of the colony in return for 
legislative concessions, so did they offer the grands blancs the perpetua-
tion of slavery in return for social justice. They claimed that they alone 
stood between the maintenance of slave society and complete anarchy; 
they were the only force which could contain the slaves. 49 The greatest 
fear of the free men of colour was assimilation into a mass of newly-freed 
slaves. 
At first, the revolution on Saint Domingue itself was dominated by 
the whites' efforts to institute self-government, but soon the question of the 
free men of colour took precedence. Upon learning of the storming of the 
Bastille, the white residents of Saint Domingue were quick to attack royal 
power on the island, and in October 1789 the intendant was forced to 
return to France. 50 At the same time, the whites usurped many of the 
old administration's powers by establishing elected municipal and pro-
vincial governments ; needless to say, these did not include free men of 
colour. 51 Soon the various governments were taken over by either grand 
blanc or petit blanc factions and began to confront each other. By early 
1790, Saint Domingue was in a state of near anarchy, and the spectacle of 
internecine fighting amongst the whites was followed closely by all non-
whites. 52 
Amidst the turmoil, the question of the free men of colour arose with 
urgency and even violence. The efforts of the free men of colour to gain 
admission into the electoral assemblies led to bloodshed late in 1789 and 
early in 1790, particularly in the West and South. 53 At Petit Gofwe, petits 
blancs began a brief reign of terror over them, 54 while at Petite Riviere, 
the free men of colour staged an abortive uprising to protest the oath 
which local whites had tried to impose upon them. The oath was humiliat-
ing: "Je jure d'etre fidele ala nation, ala loi, et au roi, d'etre soumis et 
respectueux envers les blancs, et de verser pour eux jusqu'a la derniere 
goutte de mon sang.'' 55 Rumours of uprisings abounded, and fear gripped 
large areas of the island. With tensions rising, all looked anxiously to 
49 RAIMOND, Veritables origines, p. 3. 
50 ACCMx , H 15, "Instructions pour mon successeur", October 1789. Barbois 
remained intendant-in-title until the office was abolished in June 1791. 
51 See CABON, Histoire, 3: 30-37. In a few parishes, the free men of colour were 
allowed to participate in the primary assemblies. 
52 ADSM, BDM, L 53, 4 January 1790. 
53 For the violence of late 1789 and early 1790, see ADSM, BDM, L 50, 13 October 
1789; also DEBBASCH, Couleur, I: 150, 173-74 ; ARDOUIN , Etudes , I: 22-25 . 
54 RAIMOND, Veritables origines, pp. 8-13 . 
55 Quoted in M. GATEREAU , Histoire des troubles de Saint Domingue (Paris, 1792), 
p. 43 (BN, Lk12 339); see also ADSM , BDM, L 50 , 20 February 1790. 
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Paris for a definite statement on the status of the free men of colour. When 
the 8 March Decree was finally made known, it is small wonder that it 
was received with "la joie dans tousles cceurs des colons". 56 
If the whites believed the decree to signify the dawn of a new era of 
peaceful white supremacy, the free men of colour took it as a challenge to 
their very existence. This led to further violence, at first sporadic and 
then organized under the leadership of Vincent Oge . 57 A mulatto coffee 
merchant who owned half a plantation in the northern parish of Dondon , 
Oge was in Paris on personal business when the Revolution began. He was 
soon caught up in the debates over the status of the free men of colour and 
became one of his people's leading spokesmen. After the publication of 
the 8 March Decree, Oge apparently despaired of peaceful means and 
decided to return to Saint Domingue to fight violently for his goals. His 
voyage was well publicized, and news of his arrival in October 1790 spread 
quickly throughout the colony. The news roused fear in the whites who 
expected an uprising by the free men of colour if not by the slaves. 58 
While the whites were refusing his offer to negotiate , Oge organized a 
small army in Grande Riviere and tried without success to get the free 
men of colour in the West and South to join him. Significantly, Grande 
Riviere and neighbouring Limonade were the only two parishes in the 
North where the free men of colour outnumbered the whites. 59 They were 
like two coloured islands in a hostile white sea, for in the economic heart 
of the North - the Quartiers of Limonade, Cap and Limbe - the free 
men of colour formed only thirty-five percent of the free population. 
Deceived perhaps by their strength at home, Oge's army attempted to 
march from Grande Riviere to Cap Fran<;:ais. This meant war with the 
whites. 60 After a quick victory, Oge's troops were easily routed, with 
Oge and other leaders fleeing to the Spanish end of the island. They were 
soon extradited, tried for rebellion, found guilty, broken on the wheel, 
and executed (26 February 1791). 61 This was the last time the free men of 
colour in the Northern Plain would fight the whites. Ironically , both sides 
claimed to have the same reason for fighting , namely averting a slave 
revolution. The whites felt they had to suppress the free men of colour in 
order to set an example and scare the slaves; the free men of colour want-
ed equality in order to be able to act decisively against the slaves. The 
56 According to the North Provincial Assembly, ACCMx, H 16, 17 May 1790. 
57 On Oge, see DEBBASCH, Couleur, I : 179-84 ; RAtMOND , Veritables origines, 
pp . 25-26 ; Discours historique sur les causes des desastres de Ia partie fran~aise de Saint 
Domingue (Paris, n.d.), p. 10 (BN, Lk12 402); A Particular Account of the Commencement 
and Progress of the In surrection of the Negroes in Saint-Domingue, 2nd ed. (London, 
1792), p . 21 (BN, Lk12 1320) ; CABON, Histoire, 3: 44-46 ; Orr, Haitian Revolution , 
pp. 35-36; Bryan EDWARDS, An Historical Survey of the French Colony on the Island of St. 
Dominf?o (London, 1797), pp. 39-50; ARDOUIN, Etudes, I : 32-38. 
58 For example, ADSM, BDM, L 50, 30 October 1790, 7 November 1790. 
59 All detailed population figures are from MoREAU's parish-by-parish data. 
6° For his early battles , see the London Times , 7 October 1791; also DEBIEN, 
Etudes, p. 158. 
6
' According to CABON, Histoire, 3: 45 ; OTT, Haitian Revolution, p. 39, says 9 
March; ARDOVIN , Etudes , 1:38, says 10 March . 
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whites won the battle, and their ideal of a political revolution without a 
social revolution was apparently realized. It seemed that, in the future, 
whites and free men of colour would join together under white rule to act 
against the slaves. 
This, however, was true only for the North. In the South and West, 
the Oge affair encouraged the free men of colour to unite and act violently. 
This occurred at a time when the whites were split into warring factions 
and when the influence of the French administration on the island was 
disintegrating. Since late 1789, Saint Domingue had been largely self-
governing, a state of affairs recognized by the 8 March Decree. Still, the 
national government had retained some powers, particularly in the military 
sphere, and it was the aim of the national administrators left on the island 
to use those powers to keep the colony from drifting towards complete 
independence. 
The primary scene of government activity was Port-au-Prince, 62 
and it was there that the fortunes of the free men of colour were played 
out in the most complex fashion. Although nominally the capital of the 
colony, Port-au-Prince was smaller and less important than Cap Fran<;:ais; 
it was, however, the largest city in the West Province, boasting a popula-
tion of 2,800 whites (including 1,800 permanent residents), 400 free men of 
color, and 4,000 slaves in 1789. 63 Significantly, there were relatively large 
concentrations of free men of colour in the parishes near Port-au-Prince 
as well as in the rural parts of Port-au-Prince Parish itself. 64 Since the 
early days of the Revolution, the whites in Port-au-Prince had been badly 
divided; even before the Revolution, there were apparently more radicals 
there than in Cap Fran<;:ais. 65 With the advent of the Revolution, con-
straints on political activity were removed, and the whites quickly polariz-
ed along class lines into a radical and a conservative group. Although 
Cap Fran<;:ais' whites also split into two groups, they were of unequal 
strength, with the moderate "national" party always dominating the radical 
"anti-national" one; 66 this reflected the more developed and stable society 
and economy of the city. In Port-au-Prince- a city founded only in 1750 
and situated in a relatively newly-settled province with a less sophisticated 
economy - the whites were more evenly divided, keeping the town in a 
state of constant ferment; as early as March 1790, an observer from the 
Cap predicted that Port-au-Prince would "tomber dans l'anarchie". 67 
This prediction proved accurate. After a brief radical regime, a conserva-
tive alliance of rich merchants and grands blancs, backed by the French 
62 On Port-au-Prince, see Georges CoRVINGTON, Jr, Port-au-Prince au cours des ans, 
3 vols (Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps, 1973), 2: 3-48. 
63 MOREAU, Description, 2: 1058. 
64 Ibid., 2: 1058, 1110 (Leogane), 1142 (Cayes de Jacmel), 1147 (Jacmel): also, 
913 (Mirebalais) and 861 (Varrettes). 
65 Witness the different reactions to the ordinance requiring absentee owners to 
return to Saint Domingue. It was laughed at in Cap Franc;:ais, but warmly received in Port-au-
Prince: ADSM, BDM, L 50, 14 April 1785. 
66 ACCMx, H 16, "Le moment de Ia crise", 15 June 1790. 
67 ADSM, BDM, L 50, 31 March 1790. 
22 HISTOIRE SOCIALE- SOCIAL HISTORY 
administration and the army, took power in Port-au-Prince in late July of 
1790. 68 But, on 4 March 1791 , the troops mutinied and radical petits 
blancs seized power. 69 This placed the free men of colour in a precarious 
position. Deprived of the moderating influence of the national government 
and confronted with increasing white animosity following the Oge affair, 
they more than ever had to fend for themselves. 
Ironically, just when the local French administration lost its power to 
help the free men of colour in practice, the National Assembly moved to 
support them in theory. Under constant pressure from the Amis des Noirs 
and their growing number of sympathizers, especially after the Oge affair, 
the Assembly debated colonial affairs in May 1791, and on the 15th it 
explicitly ordered that all free men of colour born to two free parents 
should have the same political rights as whites. 70 The 15 May Decree 
represented a major change in the Assembly's colonial policy . Although 
the decree began with a promise never to consider the status of those 
free men of colour having at least one enslaved parent, it intervened 
directly in internal colonial matters, thereby negating the 8 March Decree. 
Revolutionaries in France were determined to introduce the ideals of the 
R~volution into Saint Domingue, although, as the Haitian historian Adol-
phe Cabon pointed out, the decree itself was a rather precarious com-
promise between principle and expediency. 7 1 Ever since the promulga-
tion of the Declaration of Rights, the status of the free men of colour had 
proved embarrassing for the Assembly. The Declaration made no provision 
for racial distinctions, and the wording of its articles implied equality for 
all citizens regardless of race. In order to reconcile white colonial demands 
with this universalism, the Assembly allowed on 15 May for the possibility 
of equality between the races. Instead of allowing the colonists to define 
political status exclusively by race, the decree defined it in terms of a 
mixture of race and legal inheritance or birthright. The vast majority of 
the free men of colour failed to meet the new criteria for full political 
rights; a few , however, did and theoretically became full French citizens. 
When word of the 15 May Decree reached Saint Domingue, the 
whites were furious and even threatened to cut all ties with France. 72 
More importantly, they simply refused to obey the decree. Led by Gover-
nor Blanchelande himself, the colonists persisted in denying the free men 
of colour their rights, claiming that the National Assembly had exceeded 
68 
' 'Relation de ce qui s'est passe a Port-au-Prince Ia nuit du 29 au 30 juillet 1790" 
(BN , Lkl2 291) ; and "Preuves de Ia faussete de Ia relation imprimee de M. Maudit" 
(BN , Lkl2 /292). 
6 9 The official petit blanc description of the event appears in ACCMx, H 17, 8 
March 1791 , Letter from the Municipality of Port-au-Prince to the National Assembly ; see 
also ACCMx, H 17, Letter of 15 March 1791, from the North Provincial Assembly to the 
Marseilles Chamber of Commerce , for a critical account. 
70 Archives parlementaires , 26: 97. 
7 1 CABON, Histoire , 3: 60-61. 
72 For example, ADSM, BDM, L 50, I July 1790 [sic, should be 1791] ; London 
Tim es , 30 August 1791 ; Philadelphia Aurora and General Advertiser, 20 July 1791. 
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its authority when it meddled in internal colonial matters. 73 The failure of 
the 15 May Decree to improve their position brought mixed reactions 
from the free men of colour. In the North, they were relatively docile. 
The older, more stable society of the North shielded the free men of colour 
from radical petit blanc belligerence; at the same time, the overwhelming 
display of white strength during the Oge affair encouraged the free men of 
colour to accept the decree's failure with little difficulty. 74 In the West, 
they reacted more militantly. A traditional site of poor white radicalism, 
the West was the scene of great tension between the races, aggravated 
by the nearly equal sizes of the white and free non-white populations. 7 5 
Here the free men of colour adopted a more aggressive policy to get their 
rights. In the area around Port-au-Prince, armed bands of free men of 
colour began to congregate under the leadership of Bauvais, a veteran of 
the American Revolution. 76 It seemed only a matter of time before serious 
racial clashes would occur. Indeed, only the anticipation of the 27 August 
opening of the General Assembly at Cap Franyais - adjourned after a 
brief session in Leogane - seemed to forestall hostilities, as both sides 
waited to see the official colonial response to the 15 May Decree. 
By the time the General Assembly opened, the political situation on 
Saint Domingue had changed beyond all recognition. On the night of 22-23 
August, the slaves of the North Province revolted. First reports indicated 
a massive and particularly bloodthirsty slave uprising, 77 and soon whites 
were speaking of 100,000 slaves in revolt. 78 Although some declared these 
reports to be exaggerations designed to convince the National Assembly to 
abandon its support for the free men of colour, 79 it appears that the de-
struction in the North Province was great; observers commonly mentioned 
the ruin of over 200 sugar and 1 ,000 coffee plantations. 80 The planters' 
worst fears were realized, and they described the scene in nightmarish 
fashion. Typical was the account given by Bryan Edwards, a British 
planter who visited Saint Domingue shortly after the rebellion began. 
73 RAIMOND , Veritables origines, pp . 30-31 ; CORYINGTON , Port-au-Prince, 2: 42-45 ; 
ARDOUIN , Etudes , 1: 41 ; DEBBASCH, Couleur, 1: 189. 
74 RAIMOND , Veritables origines, pp. 31-32. 
75 According to MoREAU, Description, there were 13 ,764 whites and 10,942 free 
men of colour in the West (parish-by-parish basis). Not counting urban Port-au-Prince, the 
figure s were 10,964 and 10,552 , respectively. 
76 CABON , Histoire, 3: 63 ; CoRviNGTON, Port-au-Prince, 2: 46-47 ; ARDOUIN , Etu-
des, I: 44-45. 
77 For example , Archives Departementales de Ia Charente-Maritime (hereafter 
ADCM), 4J 2914, Letter from a plantation manager to the owner in France, 3 September 
1791 ; Boston Independent Chronicle, 22 and 29 September 1791 ; Philadelphia Aurora and 
General Advertiser, 21 September, 10 and 11 October 1791 ; London Times, 27 and 28 
October, 2 November 1791. 
7 8 For example, ACCMx , H 18, Letter from the General Assembly to the National 
Assembly, 13 September 1791 ; also, A Particular Account , p. 9. 
79 This is the main argument in M. MILSCENT, Sur les troubles de Saint Domingue 
(Paris, 1791) (BN, Lkl2 362). 
Ho For mstance, ACCMx , H 18, Letter from the General Assembly to the National 
Assembly , 13 September 1791 ; A Particular Account, p. 13; ADCM, 4J 2915, Letter from 
Macary to Belin heirs , October 1791 ; M. BAILLIO, Un mot de verite sur les malheurs de 
Saint Domingue (Paris , 1791) , p . 2 (BN , Lkl2 371). 
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Upwards of one hundred thousand savage people , habituated to the barbarities 
of Africa, avail themselves of the silence and obscurity of the night and faU 
on the peaceful and unsuspicious planters, like so many famished tigers thirsting 
for human blood. 8 1 
The slave rebellion and the ensuing war between whites and slaves 
placed the free men of colour in a delicate but potentially advantageous 
position. Depending on the situation in each parish of the colony , they 
adopted different tactics, but always with the view of realizing their tra-
ditional goal of full equality with the whites in a slave society. In the 
central areas of the North where the slave rebellion occurred, the free 
men of colour had little room to manoeuvre and had to support either the 
slaves or the whites. They decided to aid the whites, believing that com-
plete loyalty to the whites would be rewarded with political rights. They 
bore the brunt of the fighting against the slaves, just as in the old regime 
they had been assigned the task of hunting down escaped slaves. For all 
their efforts, the free men of colour never succeeded in gaining concessions 
from the whites in the North . At best, they managed temporarily to avoid 
being engulfed in the slave revolution. 
If all out warfare in the North Province, together with fears of losing 
their privileged position in a slave society, encouraged the free men of 
colour there to join the whites, the lack of general slave uprisings in the 
West and South enabled local free men of colour to adopt more flexible 
policies. Particularly in the West Province where they formed nearly half 
the free population, the free men of colour did not intend to commit them-
selves without qualification to the whites. They claimed that their presence 
alone was responsible for the relative calm amongst the slaves, 82 and they 
believed that they could invoke the threat of instigating slave revolts in 
order to gain concessions from the whites. They also felt that, if necessary, 
they could fight the whites while keeping the slaves from rebelling, or 
while controlling any rebellion which might occur. These various and not 
necessarily consistent policies were all pursued in late 1791 and early 
1792 by the free men of colour in the West and South. In this way, the 
next stage of the Haitian Revolution, extending from 22 August 1791 to 
4 April 1792, had two distinct branches: in the North, it was characterized 
by war between free men of all colours and slaves, while in the South and 
West it was dominated by fighting between whites and free men of colour. 
The key to the West and South was Port-au-Prince, and this white 
stronghold in a predominantly free coloured area was the scene of almost 
continual fighting from August 1791 to July 1792. The actions and policies 
of the free men of colour throughout the West and South were influenced 
by events in Port-au-Prince and reflected to a large extent the frequent 
changes in the policies of the Port-au-Prince whites. As we have seen, 
Port-au-Prince was badly divided between rich and poor whites, and this 
prevented the whites from adopting a coherent policy towards the free 
men of colour. When the rich were in power, concessions were offered the 
81 EDWARDS, Historical Survey, p. 63. 
82 RAIMOND , V eritab/es origines , p. 36. 
THE FREE MEN OF COLOUR 25 
free men of colour; the merchants and planters urged conciliation because 
they had too much to lose in a general conflagration. When the poor were 
in power, they followed an aggressive policy towards the free men of 
colour; the petits blancs had little to lose and even tried to link racial 
warfare to class warfare. According to one moderate white, the poor 
whites 
ne s 'entretenaient que du gain qu ' ils feraient sur les gens de couleur en pil-
lant leurs mai sons. Ils s' entendaient en propos les plu s injurieux contre les 
pompons blancs, qu'ils regardaient comme des aristocrates. 83 
Given the uncertain powers of the grands blancs, the belligerent intran-
sigence of the petits blancs, and the aims of the free men of colour, war 
between the last two at least was inevitable . Legal equality could not be 
achieved peacefully because it implied a social'revolution which would 
undermine the petits blancs' place in society. If wealth replaced race as 
the criterion for status, many free men of colour would rise above the 
poor whites, and all free men of colour would be at least equal to the 
petits blancs . Thus, legal equality could be achieved only by military 
victory. 
The political instability of Port-au-Prince became clear late in 1791, 
as power in the city changed hands no less than four times from 22 August 
until 21 November. At first , the petits blancs were still in control follow-
ing their coup d'etat of March. When they received news of the slave 
rebellion in the North , they decided to attack the local free men of colour 
who had fled from the city fearing reprisals brought on by the 15 May 
Decree. After several skirmishes, a decisive battle was fought on 2 Sep-
tember at Pernier a few miles north of Port-au-Prince. 84 The whites were 
easily defeated , and the petits blancs fell from power. They were replaced 
by grands blancs and merchants who signed a concordat with the free 
men of colour on 11 September. 85 The whites promised to accept the 
Decrees of 8 March and 15 May, and agreed to the reorganization of the 
island's various assemblies to accommodate the free men of colour. The 
peace , however, lasted only until early October, when petits blancs re-
gained the ascendancy in the town and refused to honour the terms of the 
concordat. 86 
Within a week, the grands blancs seized power again in Port-au-
Prince and began new negotiations with the free men of colour at nearby 
83 Public Record Office, High Court of the Admiralty (hereafter PRO, HCA) , 
30/381 , "Un [sic] insurrection dans Ia partie de Port-au-Prince commence [sic] Ie 28 aoust ' 
1791", 31 August 1791. See also the letter from a planter quoted in DEBBASCH, Couleur, 
I: 205, "This war is now becoming one of the worthless against the rich." 
84 For a first-hand description, dated 5 September 179 1, see the one presented in 
Gabriel DEB IEN, " Nouvelles de Saint Domingue (1790-1791)", Annates Hist oriques de Ia 
Rholution Fra m;aise, 32 (1960): 191. 
85 
" Concordat de MM les citoyens blancs du Port-au-Prince avec MM les citoyens 
de couleur. " (BN, Lk12 350). 
86 For the peace and its breakdown, see PRO, HCA, 30/381 , 12 September to II 
October 1791 ; and accounts from I and 8 October 1791 , in DEBIEN, " Nouvelles", pp. 
193-94. 
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Croix-des-Bouquets. 87 This time, the negotiations involved representatives 
from all over the West Province. Unlike the poorer whites , the rich had 
not lost sight of the fundamental danger facing the island's free popula-
tion: the threat of slave revolt. The planters realized that a major slave 
rebellion was a far greater worry than the granting of political equality 
to the free men of colour, and they knew that only the free men of colour 
could be relied upon to put down such rebellion . As one plantation director 
put it , 
Si nous eprouvions une revolte de nos esclaves aussi decidee que celle de Ia 
province du Nord ... nous n' aurions aucun secours a esperer de ceux qui ont 
ete envoyes de France pour nous proteger et qui n'ont cesse de fomenter les 
troubles et les divisions . Heureusement ... les citoyens de couleur no us aideront 
a repousser !'insurrection des noirs, si elle a lieu . 88 
After a week of negotiations , representatives from fourteen parishes 
reached an agreement, and a "peace treaty" was signed on 23 October on 
the Damiens Plantation. 89 The treaty was basically a restatement of the 
11 September concordat, and - on paper at least - the free men of 
colour gained full equality. 
The peace began well, but foundered on 21 November, when petits 
blancs regained control of Port-au-Prince. Racial conflict ensued: white 
soldiers executed a free man of colour without trial, rioting broke out, 
and by the next day Port-au-Prince was in flames. 90 Most of the free men 
of colour fled to join their people in the countryside, but those who could 
not escape - mostly women and children - were ruthlessly massacred by 
the whites. 
With the burning of Port-au-Prince and the slaughter of the free men 
of colour, the struggle entered a critical period which lasted until the Spring 
of 1792, when Saint Domingue whites accepted full political equality for 
the free men of colour. This was not achieved peacefully, but by acts and 
threats of violence. Indeed, in the one area where the free men of colour 
fai led to adopt a violent posture, they failed to gain concessions. This 
was in the central area of the North, the site of the slave rebellion. In 
siding with the whites against the slaves , the free men of colour in the 
Northern Plain forfeited their political development and accepted the 
perpetuation of their inferior status . Greatly outnumbered by the whites, 
weakened by the Oge affair, and afraid of losing their privileged posi-
tion if the slave revolt succeeded , the free men of colour in the North 
made few demands on the whites and did not protest their refusal to grant 
87 PRO, HCA , 30/381, 13 October 1791 ; and account from 15 October 1791, in 
DEBIEN , '"Nouvelles", p. 196. The chief negotiator for the Port-au-Prince whites was Cara-
deux , a rich planter (MOREAU , Description , 2: 950) . He was assisted by, among others , 
Leremboure, a rich merchant (ibid . : 1031 , 1032, 1034). 
88 Account from 15 October 1791 , in DEBIEN, " Nouvelles", p. 1%. 
89 
'"Traite de paix entre les citoyens blancs et les citoyens de couleur des 14 pa-
roisses de Ia province de !'Ouest de Ia partie fran<,:aise de Saini-Domingue." (BN, Lk12 355) . 
90 Boston Independent Chronicle, 22 December 1791 , 5 January 1792; Philadelphia 
Aurora and General Advertiser, 28 December 1791 , 20 January 1792 ; ARDOUIN , Etudes, 
I: 61-62 , blames the petits blancs for burning Port-au-Prince . 
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equality. This acquiescent attitude influenced future Haitian development: 
following independence , the North became the bastion of the black poli-
tician descended from the rebel slaves. 
In the rest of the colony , the free men of colour used the threat of 
violence as an effective political weapon. Nowhere was this displayed 
better than in the outlying areas of the North itself. These areas were 
largely spared slave rebellions, and the free men of colour used the threat 
of instigating slave rebellions to support their demands for concessions. In 
almost all cases, property-owning whites preferred political defeat to utter 
ruin, and in a series of concordats signed throughout the Northern pe-
riphery , they accepted the demands. 91 Only in Fort Dauphin was no 
concordat signed , and here the free men of colour burned down the plan-
tations. 92 
Similar events occurred in the West. 9 3 Without a general slave re-
bellion to make them timid, the free men of colour drove hard bargains 
and were successful in almost all instances. By early 1792, most of the 
West was covered by concordats, thereby signifying a major shift of 
power. White planters who dominated the countryside sacrificed racial 
and political superiority in order to retain their economic base , and the 
revolution was carried on in relative peace throughout most of the West. 
The threat of violence sufficed. Only Port-au-Prince , home of property-
less petits blancs, held out and was the scene of almost constant fighting 
until , on 5 July 1792, an alliance of grands blancs and free men of colour 
finally took control of the city. 
The South proved even more difficult than the West. 94 Lacking the 
moderating influence of a strong grand blanc class, the South experienced 
bitter fighting between petits blancs and free men of colour. The South was 
Saint Domingue's developing " frontier" and was largely devoid of stable 
political or social institutions. Before the Revolution, the petits blancs and 
free men of colour had competed there for new lands; in many places , 
the latter won the economic battle, leaving the former with only their 
feelings of racial superiority. Worse , in the parishes of Cayes and Torbec, 
exceptionally large concentrations of whites and free men of colour, 
respectively , faced each other, and it was there that war erupted once the 
Revolution began. It took a series of armed victories by the free men of 
colour, together with the proclamation of the 4 April Law and fear of 
spreading slave rebellions - rebellions which had originally been encourag-
ed for partisan reasons by both camps - to bring the two sides into an 
uneasy peace. By mid-1792, the South was relatively quiet, mostly under 
the control of the free men of colour. 
9 1 DEBBASCH, Couleur, I : 213-15, lists these. 
92 Boston Independent Chronicle, 22 March 1792. There was no general slave revolt 
in Fort Dauphin (CABON , Histoire, 3: 70-71) . 
93 ARDO UI N, Etudes, I : 66-72 ; Boston Independent Chronicle, 26 January , 16 
February , 3 May , 5 and 16 July 1792 ; CORVINGTON , Port-au-Prince , 2: 63-81. 
94 On the South , see Bernard FoUBERT, " Colons et esclaves du Sud de Saint Do-
mingue au debut de Ia Revolution" , R evue Franr;a ise d' Histoire d' Outre-Mer, 61 (1974) : 
199-217 ; also, CABON , Histoire, 3 : 86-88, 92-93 ; ARDOUIN, Etudes , I : 67-69 . 
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While the free men of colour were taking matters into their hands on 
most of Saint Domingue, the National Assembly made concerted efforts 
to regain control of the colony. On 24 September 1791, it suspended the 
15 May Decree, in an effort to win back white allegiance. 95 A few days 
later, the Assembly sent three civil commissioners - Mirbeck, Roome and 
Saint-Leger - to implement its policies and bring peace to the island. 
The commissioners soon failed and prepared to leave the colony in mid-
1792. By this time, the French were ready to try a different strategy based 
on support for the free men of colour. The newly-established Legislative 
Assembly, under the influence of Brissot and the abolitionists, declared 
on 28 March that all free men of colour had full rights and that new elec-
tions must be held. 96 Proclaimed law by the King on 4 April and publish-
ed officially on Saint Domingue in mid-May, the new decree was a com-
plete victory for the free men of colour. Coming after the free men of 
colour's military success, it was accepted at first by most of the colony's 
whites without great difficulty, thus ending for a while the war between 
the two groups. 
With the publication of the 4 April Law, the free men of colour 
ceased to exist as a legal class. There were only free men and slaves. 
Although some skirmishes continued, all out warfare between the petits 
blancs and the "citizens of 4 April" temporarily ceased and in most areas 
the two united to suppress the slave rebellions which were spreading to 
the West and South. This proved a futile exercise, for slavery was abol-
ished within seventeen months. In a last-ditch effort to keep Saint Domin-
gue both French and "revolutionary", Saint-Leger Sonthonax, pre-eminent 
among the three civil commissioners sent by the Assembly to implement 
the 4 April Law, emancipated the slaves on 29 August 1793. Now the 
special class of free men of colour ceased to exist in practice as well as in 
theory, and the way was cleared for the establishment of a new social 
hierarchy based on race. Saint Domingue was divided in practice into 
whites, mulattoes, and blacks. Finally, shortly after proclaiming inde-
pendence on 1 January 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines ordered the liquida-
tion of Haiti's whites and the country belonged exclusively to mulattoes 
and blacks. For the next two centuries, skin colour, social status, po-
litical power, and wealth would be as closely aligned as they had been 
before the middle of the eighteenth century. 
RESUME. 
Les gens de cou/eur fibres jouerent un role crucial aux premiers stades de Ia 
rlh•olution hai'tienne. lndignes de leur situation humi/iante dans Ia societe coloniale, 
its appuyerent Ia Revolution dans /' espoir d' atteindre /'ega lite complete avec les 
blancs. /Is croyaient que Ia richesse et non Ia couleur de Ia peau devait determiner 
le statut social et politique. En venant a bout de Ia resistance opiniatre des blancs 
de Ia colonie, les gens de couleur fibres /' emporterent le 4 avril 1792, jour oii 
fut proclamee une loi franr,:aise leur garantissant to us les droits civiques. La 
societe coloniale ne reconnut desormais que deux categories d' hommes: les fibres 
et les escla1'es. 
95 Archives parlementaires, 31: 288. 
96 Ibid., 40: 575-76. 
